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Resumo
No mundo de hoje, as redes WiFi são comuns e estão ligadas ao nosso dia-a-dia: acedemos-lhes
com os nossos smartphones, os nossos tablets e os nossos portáteis. Isto significa que inevitavel-
mente muitos dados sensíveis são transmitidos nestas redes. Um ataque malicioso convencional
tentaria aceder a estes dados. Um exemplo seria o de um hacker a tentar desencriptar as comuni-
cações de um utilizador para tentar obter a sua password.
A encriptação, que está presente em virtualmente todas as redes WiFi, pode ajudar a proteger
os dados de um utilizador de acessos externos. No entanto, através de ataques side-channel é pos-
sível obter informação e quebrar a privacidade de uma pessoa, independentemente da encriptação.
Estes ataques diferem dos seus equivalentes convencionais no sentido de que o atacante está fora
do sistema e não tenta obter acesso a ele. De facto, um ataque side-channel baseia-se nas carac-
terísticas dos dados transferidos, que podem ser observados desde fora, em vez dos conteúdos.
Esta tese tem o propósito de planear um destes ataques. O objetivo do ataque é identificar o
website a que um dado utilizador está a aceder, tendo acesso apenas ao tráfego WiFi encriptado
que o dispositivo do utilizador está a gerar. O tráfego pode ser capturado e processado por um
computador com uma placa de rede com capacidades WiFi, que precisa de estar nas proximidades
do dispositivo alvo. Em paralelo ao acesso ao website ruído ao nível da rede, como streaming de
música ou DHCP, pode existir. Por outro lado, as características do website - que pode ser mais ou
menos estático - pode torná-lo mais difícil de identificar. O grau de influência que estes factores
poderão ter na identificação de websites é estudada nesta tese.
Websites podem ser caraterizados pelas suas capturas de tráfego. A partir destas capturas
pode-se calcular um conjunto de features, como o número de bytes ou os pacotes por segundo. De
forma a conseguir identificar os websites, o primeiro passo é constuir um dataset com as features
das capturas realizadas anteriormente para cada um dos websites selecionados para o ataque. De
seguida, um algoritmo de Machine Learning que seja capaz de de prever o website a que uma nova
captura pertence com base em dados anterior é desenvolvido e aplicado.
De forma a realizar testes, um dataset foi construído com as features de capturas pertencentes
a dez websites diferentes, sendo que metade são estáticos e a outra metade são mais dinâmicos.
Cinco níveis de ruído foram considerados, incluindo o caso em que não existe ruído.
Testes efetuados com as capturas mostram que um atacante pode identificar qualquer um dos
websites utilizando o algoritmo desenvolvido para esta tese. O score F1, que é uma métrica para
medir a eficácia dos testes, é 77% quando o ruído não é considerado e 69% quando é.
Os resultados mostram que as instâncias em que o algoritmo toma um website por outro ocor-
rem principalmente dentro da mesma classe - estático ou dinâmico. Isto significa que websites
dinâmicos raramente são confundidos com estáticos, e vice-versa.
Quando o ruído é considerado, os resultados não são conclusivos. A deteção de alguns web-
sites permanece relativamente inafetada pelo ruído, enquanto que outros mostram um aumento ou
diminuição da eficácia em certos níveis de ruído. Não existe um padrão uniforme, o que significa
que mais testes com diferentes tipos de ruídos são necessários.
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Abstract
In today’s world, WiFi networks are widespread and intertwined with our daily lives: we access
them through our smartphones, our tablets and our laptops. This means that inevitably a lot of sen-
sitive data is transferred through these networks. A conventional malicious attack would attempt
to gain access to such data. An example would be that of an hacker trying to decrypt a user’s
communications in order to obtain his password.
Encryption, which is present in virtually every Wi-Fi network, can help protect a user’s data
from outside access. Nonetheless, through side-channel attacks it is possible to obtain information
and potentially breach a user’s privacy, regardless of the encryption. These attacks differ from their
more conventional counterparts in that the attacker is outside the system and does not attempt to
gain access to it. In fact, a side-channel attack relies on the characteristics of the transferred data,
which can be observed from the outside, instead of its content.
This thesis has the purpose of devising such an attack. The objective of the attack is to identify
the website a given user is accessing, having access only to the encrypted WiFi traffic the user’s
device is generating. The traffic can be captured and processed by a computer with a WiFi-capable
network card, which needs to be near the target’s device. In parallel with the accessing of the
website, network-level noise, such as music streaming or DHCP traffic, may exist. On the other
hand, the characteristics of the website - it can be more or less static - can make it more difficult
to identify. The degree of influence these factors may have on website identification is studied in
this thesis.
Websites can be characterized by their traffic captures. From these captures one can calculate
a set of features, such as bytecount and the average packet size. In order to be able to identify
websites, the first step is to build a dataset with the features of captures performed beforehand for
each of the websites selected for the attack. Afterwards, a machine learning algorithm that can
predict the website a new capture belongs to based on the previous data is applied.
In order to perform testing, a dataset was built with the features of the captures belonging to
ten different websites, with half being static and half being more dynamic. Five levels of noise
were considered, including the case in which there is no noise.
Testing performed with the captures shows that an attacker can identify any of the websites
using the algorithm developed in this thesis. The average F1 score, which is a metric to measure
the accuracy of the tests, is 77% when noise isn’t considered and 69% when it is.
The results show that the instances in which the algorithm mistakes a website for another
mostly occur within the same class - static or dynamic. This means that dynamic websites are
rarely confused with static websites, and vice-versa.
When noise is considered, the results are not conclusive. The detection of some websites
remains relatively unaffected by the noise, while others show an increase or a decrease of the
accuracy on certain noise levels. There is no uniform pattern across the websites, which means
that further testing with different types of noise is needed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context
WiFi, also known as 802.11, is the de facto standard for wireless communications, as it is nowa-
days widely used by many people, especially in developed countries. WiFi networks can be found
anywhere, from regular households to public places such as airports or libraries, and they are easily
accessible to most people. In fact, 64% of the population in the United States owns a smartphone
[4], which is one of many devices capable of connecting to these networks. A natural consequence
of these facts is that a large volume of Internet traffic flows through WiFi networks (as much as
68% of all traffic by 2017 [5]), which means that a lot of sensitive data may be transmitted through
them. Activities such as shopping and social networking entail the transmission of private infor-
mation that could be used by an attacker.
Internet users are getting more and more worried about their privacy, with as many as 86% of
them having taken steps to remove or mask their Internet footprints [6]. However, there is next
to no awareness of the dangers and possible information leaks that can come from the usage of a
WiFi network.
WiFi networks are considered secure, with the vast majority of them offering encryption such
as WPA or WPA2. One may think that this means they are safe, but in fact they are not. Even with-
out breaking the encryption, there are ways to extract potentially dangerous information simply
by passively collecting data from the "outside". This type of attack is called "side-channel", and
allows an attacker who is eavesdropping on a WiFi network to obtain compromising information
of an unsuspecting person, which may then be used for blackmailing, extortion or phishing scams.
Current 802.11 standards do not contemplate any counter-measures to this type of attack,
which are only recently being studied. This means that more likely than not, anyone who uses a
WiFi-enabled device such as a smartphone or a laptop is possibly exposed and may be the target
of a side-channel attack.
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1.2 Motivation
In a world in which more and more of our communications are done through WiFi networks, it
is of vital importance to ensure that all network traffic carrying sensitive information is as secure
and private as possible. Side-channel attacks are a big security threat since they allow profiling
and activity monitoring of targets who are using a wireless network, while they remain unaware
of the privacy breach. Furthermore, encrypting the traffic does not stop side-channel information
leaks from occurring, since they are based in characteristics that remain largely independent from
the type of encryption.
This work aims to raise awareness about the vulnerability of WiFi networks to this type of
attack, so that effective counter-measures may be implemented.
1.3 Objectives and contributions
The final objective of this thesis is to develop a solution which can detect and classify WiFi traffic,
through the perspective of an outside attacker. This solution, based on machine learning, allows
for specific characterization of an individual’s activity in terms of which websites he is accessing.
Websites can be more or less static, depending on the content they have. In this thesis the
testing is performed for both dynamic and mostly static websites, so as to determine if the accuracy
of the classification depends on this characteristic.
The influence of network-level noise on the accuracy of the classification of WiFi traffic is also
studied in this thesis. Several levels of noise are considered, so as to determine how the accuracy
changes with the increase of the noise.
1.4 Dissertation Structure
On Chapter 2 a general review of the theoretical elements that are essential to this thesis are
explained, including important concepts such as the functioning of WiFi and the structure of a
side-channel attacks on 802.11. Examples of implementations of side-channel attacks are also
described. Chapter ?? explains the problem which this thesis seeks to address. An example of a
real world scenario of an attack is presented. On the chapter 3 the proposed solution is presented
in mostly theoretical terms. Chapter 4 pertains to the methodology and experimental procedures
regarding the capture of traffic and its subsequent processing. The obtained results are analyzed
on chapter 5, with the aid of visual representations such as graphs and matrices. Finally, the
conclusions and analysis of the results are made on 6.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
There are a number of concepts that one needs to understand before reading about the implemen-
tation of this thesis, and as such in the following sections they will be presented and explained.
Some are more general than others, and as the document progresses the research becomes more
focused, ending in the analysis of various works which took on a similar problem to the one that’s
presented here.
2.1 Privacy
In 2016, the number of Internet users has reached an all-time record of 47% of the world population
is using the Internet. When considering only the developed countries, this percentage rises to 81%
[7].
With the number of people online increasing, so does the number of dangers to their privacy.
In fact, 50% of Internet users cite concern with the amount of information that is available about
them online, and 55% have taken steps to escape observation from external entities [6]. Protecting
their privacy when using the Internet is, in fact, a matter of paramount importance for many people.
One of the most common measures to ensure confidentiality is the encryption of communica-
tions, which is widespread nowadays. Many websites offer HTTPS, which is a protocol for secure
data transmission in computer networks. At the same time, data sent wirelessly between a device
and an access point is encrypted, making it difficult for an attacker to obtain information. How-
ever, there is one type of attack that can circumvent all of these security measures and still obtain
information: side-channel attacks. This type of attack, which is not well known to the general
public, poses a serious threat to the privacy of many people. In the "Side-channel attacks" section,
which can be found some pages ahead, the reason why they are so effective is explained.
2.2 WiFi
WiFi is a wireless networking technology based on the standards described in IEEE 802.11 [8].
Common WiFi networks provide connection to the Internet via an access point, to which a user
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can connect to using a range of devices, namely smartphones and laptops.
Since its inception in 1997, the 802.11 standard has gone through several improvements. For
instance, one of the most recent revisions, known as 802.11, allows for greater data rates as well
as use of multiple antennas.
Today, one can find a WiFi network nearly everywhere in big cities, be it in households, places
such as universities and libraries, or even public transportation. They provide fast, reliable access
to the Internet and are used daily by millions of people for many purposes. But for for all their
strengths, they also have weaknesses, which will be addressed in this section. In addition, we
will delve into some of the technical details of WiFi technology that make side-channel attacks
possible.
2.2.1 Technical details
802.11 networks are different from their older, fully wired counterpart: Ethernet. The major
difference and improvement is the fact that they are wireless, making them a type of WLAN
(Wireless Local Area Network). One of the components that makes wireless connection possible
is called "access point", or AP, and it is present in most WiFi networks. The AP is responsible for
converting the frames used in wireless transmissions into a form that is compatible with the wired
part of the network.
RF transmissions generally occur in the 2.4 GHz frequency band [9], but other bands such as
3.6, 5 or 60 GHz are also supported by various revisions of the standard.
WiFi operates in the PHY and MAC layers of the OSI model (figure 2.1). The first handles the
physical component, needed for data transmission and reception, while the latter defines they way
to access the medium and transfer data.
Figure 2.1: How 802.11 fits in the OSI model. (source: [1])
The frames transmitted in the MAC layer transport follow the philosophy of encapsulation
present in the OSI model, by adding information relevant to its layer (in broader terms, the link
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layer) on top of the data it intends to transport. This additional information is located in the header,
which occupies 30 bytes and is divided into several parts.
Figure 2.2: The structure of an 802.11 MAC frame. (source: [1])
The structure of these frames includes the following components in the header section:
• Frame Control: specifies the version of the protocol being used. Also includes other infor-
mation, such as the type and function of the frame.
• Duration/ID: can serve many functions. For example, it can contain the number of a mil-
liseconds the system expects to take to transmit the current frame.
• Addresses: contain the addresses of the sender, the receiver, the source and the transmitter.
• Sequence Control: includes the number attributed to the frame.
After the header comes the frame body, which contains the bulk of the data. The length is
variable, since it allows for any amount of data to be transmitted so long as it doesn’t exceed the
maximum size of the frame. This data is almost invariably encrypted, so as to protect the privacy
of the users of the network.
Encryption in WiFi network used to be performed using the Wired Equivalent Privacy algo-
rithm, or WEP, which was the standard until 2004. It used the RC4 stream cypher to provide
confidentiality [9]. Its many design flaws made it insecure, and in fact it is possible to crack
WEP-encrypted communications with relative ease. The need for a stronger security mechanism
facilitated the development of WPA and WPA2, which do not have as many flaws as their pre-
decessor. WPA includes improvements such as message integrity checks and larger security keys
[10], while WPA2 - the superior, more recent version - offers further improvements. The most
notable ones are the use of AES algorithms, as well as the introduction of CCMP (Counter Cipher
Mode with Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol).
2.3 Machine learning
Machine learning (ML) algorithms allow the computer that is running them to perform tasks with-
out being clearly programmed to do so [11]. They are becoming more and more popular, due to
their ability to process great amounts of data in order to reach decisions. These decisions are not
completely deterministic, as with traditional computer programs. Instead, they use an heuristic
approach, which does not yield a completely accurate decision. However, the trade-off is worth it
since they allow much more flexibility than traditional programs, while being easier to configure
and develop.
6 Literature Review
An important feature of ML algorithms is that they can learn from data they are "fed". The
more data they have, the more accurately they can make their predictions. This is why they are
important to this thesis, as we will see ahead.
2.4 Side-channel attacks
As far as encryption goes, side-channel attacks are somewhat different from most commonly
known attack. They are not based on flaws in the encryption algorithm or its implementation,
and they don’t use brute force. In fact, decryption is not an objective of a side-channel attack.
Instead, the general approach when performing this type of attack is to obtain side-channel infor-
mation, which can be defined as the data one can obtain by observing the physical processes in the
cryptographic system.
Side-channel attacks are often "more effective than the conventional mathematical analysis
based attacks and are much more practical to mount"[12], making them a powerful tool for modern
attackers. They can be classified in a variety of ways. For instance, there can be passive and active
attacks, with the former having the attacker in an observing, non-interfering role and the latter
implying some sort of forced physical interaction by the attacker. Passive attacks are normally
non-invasive, which means that they exploit that which can be obtained without tampering or
sabotaging the physical system. A very advantageous characteristic of this type of attack is that
it is virtually undetectable. The attacks which are more relevant to the thesis are, in fact, non-
invasive. Further ahead we will see some examples.
There are other ways of categorizing side-channel attacks, depending on the exploited charac-
teristics of the target system. Some examples:
• Timing attacks. These attacks rely on the time interval between certain actions in the system.
A general activity a user may be performing normally entails a certain sequence of actions
which will presumably have a similar timing between them. This allows the attacker to
profile the actions and identify them.
• Power Analysis attacks. The computation associated with a process will have potentially
similar power consumption profiles every time, providing for a way to identify actions.
• Electromagnetic attacks. EM emissions caused by a given process may be a way to identify
them. This type of attack can be very effective and is often used in military contexts. [12]
Having analysed the various characteristics of side-channel attacks, the logical conclusion
is that no matter how strong or well-designed an algorithm is, if the system that it will be imple-
mented on is not secure, then it will be vulnerable. WiFi networks are an example of such systems,
because a passive observer is able to capture the information transmitted between a device and an
access point. The kind of attacks which will be studied for this thesis primarily fall under the "Tim-
ing attack" classification, though many of their elements and criteria are not typically considered
in the general definition of a side-channel attack.
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2.5 Implementations of side-channel attacks
In this section a number of different approaches to side-channel attacks will be presented. Most of
them are closely related to the problem at hand (WiFi networks), while some are broader in scope.
All of them present considerable insight into what an efficient, appropriate solution might be.
2.5.1 In WiFi networks
Before delving into the many articles written regarding this are, it would be useful to understand
the general situation in which side-channel attacks in WiFi networks operate.
Generally speaking, there is a person using a device such as a laptop or smartphone, which is
connected to the Internet via an access point. The connection is wireless and encrypted. Nearby,
an attacker passively "observes" the traffic between the device and the access point, and then uses
the gathered data for a number of purposes, which could include blackmailing or phishing. The
situation is best understood by analysing figure 2.3 .
Figure 2.3: A typical side-channel attack in a WiFi network. (source: [2])
As we can see, the target of the attack has no way of knowing they are being attacked, and will
probably think they are safe given the encrypted nature of the traffic. However, an attacker can
gather a lot of information from this position.
There are some very powerful packet "sniffing" tools, such as Wireshark, that gather informa-
tion such as the timing, length or frequency of the packets. From a capture file there can be many
conclusions, mainly in terms of statistical treatment of the data. The parameters considered in the
statistics are called features. Which ones the attacker chooses to perform the attack depend on the
final objective.
A good example of a side-channel attack in WiFi networks is [3]. The authors developed an
algorithm capable of determing which app a given person was using on their smartphone, with
only of a few seconds of capture time. They achieved this by using a Machine Learning algorithm,
which was fed with data they captured from different mobile applications.
The packet captures were initially done using Wireshark in a controlled environment. This is
needed in order to have reference points, by being able to associate certain patterns to the mobile
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applications. These patterns were then studied, and some features were selected based on how
different they were between different apps. The most important features are the frame length and
their inter-arrival time.
These captures were then used to develop a Machine Learning algorithm that is able to classify
traffic, that is, to determine to which app it belongs to, based on the data it already has. The
algorithm is based on random forests (RF), which form decision trees in order to reach a decision.
RF are considered to be very efficient, since there are multiple decision trees involved in a decision.
This factor decreases the bias and the errors caused by small deviations.
By analysing the dataset they created, it was possible to conclude that applications generate
distinguishable traffic patterns, especially when they belong to different categories (for instance,
gaming vs. instant messages). This is the essential factor that allows this attack to be effective.
The approach they took for the attack is similar to the one previously described, with a few
differences. For instance, they focused only on smartphones, and considered the need to identify
a particular smartphone when there are many of them connected to the same access point. The
method they used is called MAC address filtering, which takes advantage of certain patterns in
the MAC address of the devices. For example, iPhones have similar address structure between
themselves. The lists that contain this data are called OUI (organizationally unique identifier)
lists.
Figure 2.4: Setup used in [3].
After picking a target, the attacker then collects traffic from that user for 300 seconds. This
is enough time to determine which application us being used, with accuracy levels no lower than
87% when contemplating the complete features. As we can see, not much time of "attacking" is
needed to obtain very good results.
Like the example previously explained, there are other approaches very much worth consider-
ing. Another interesting article is [13]. The approach the authors took is quite detailed and varied,
allowing for a better understanding of the several ways of approaching the problem at hand. They
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used a combination of features to classify the traffic while considering the possibility of concur-
rent activity between different types of application. The packet capture only has to run for a few
seconds for the algorithm to work properly. Unlike [3], the devices used on the testing are laptops.
Among the other articles found regarding side-channel attacks in WiFi networks, [14] and
[15] stand out, by covering side-channel attacks in other contexts. In [14] the approach is slightly
different since the study is made on 3G networks instead of Wi-Fi. That said, the methodology
and approach are quite relevant to this thesis. On the other hand, [15] does use Wi-Fi networks and
is relevant for other reasons. While the aforementioned articles have the objective of identifying
either the application or the website a person is using, this one aims to classify specific user actions
inside some select websites. The information they extract is from websites that handle sensitive
information, related to areas such as health or personal finance. This may prove interesting in the
perspective of an attacker, seeing that this kind of detailed information may make extortions or
phishing scams easier. Similarly, [16] have implemented an algorithm that can detect what a user
is searching, based on information leaked by suggest boxes that are common in many websites.
Side-channel attacks can also have a more focused objective, which can make them more
accurate. That is the case with [17], in which an algorithm is developed with the ability to detect
Skype traffic with very high accuracy.
One of the most potentially damaging models for a side-channel attack was devised in [2].
Their algorithm is capable of extracting very personal information, such as age, gender, religion
and sexual orientation. This information is leaked by mobile applications, and can be obtained
in real time. The drawback is that the false positive rate is relatively high: 38%. That said, it is
still a highly dangerous attack, that if improved represents a very serious risk to privacy in WiFi
networks.
2.5.2 Others
Besides the types of side-channel discussed in the previous section, there are others worth men-
tioning, even if they don’t have as much of a direct relation to the approach described in this
report.
Side-channel attacks on smartphones are not limited to WiFi networks. In fact, it is possible to
capture data transmitted through 3G/UMTS - and in [14], that is the approach they took. The final
objective of their investigation was to determine if it was possible to fingerprint a specific device
based on the background traffic generated by the apps it is running, and indeed it was. To that
end, captures are made to obtain the relevant side-channel information, which is then classified
according to features such as timing or bytes transmitted. Based on this, the algorithm is capable
of associating a phone with a specific UMTS cell, which represents a privacy breach. The main
concern about this approach is that the capture time needs to be of about 15 minutes in order to
obtain optimal accuracy (more than 90
Another side-channel attack which can represent a very serious invasion of privacy is [18].
Their algorithm uses leaked electromagnetic information to deduce a mobile phone’s password
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with a high accuracy rate. When holding a phone, the way the hand is holding it and the fin-
ger motions used to input the password lead to an interference to multi-path signals. These are
reflected by the CSI, or channel state information. The algorithm, when in possession of this infor-
mation, can "exploit the strong correlation between the CSI fluctuation and the keystrokes to infer
the user’s number input". After obtaining the password, the attacker may be able to compromise
the phone and the accounts associated to its apps.
2.5.3 Counter-measures
Defending against a side-channel attack can be a challenging task. As we saw, these attacks bypass
any attempts at encrypting the communications between the user and the access point. To make
things worse, normally speaking a website or mobile application does not take any precautionary
measures to defend against side-channel attacks.
The communication between a device and the AP is done when necessary and as soon as
possible, which allows for timing attacks. On the other hand, each frame sent or received contains
only the data it needs to transmit, which permits attacks based on the size of the packets. With
this in mind, an effective counter-measure would be to time the frame transmission in regular
intervals regardless of the content, as well as distribute the data throughout several frames. This
solution entails some problems however, mainly in the aspect of user experience. Instead of the
quasi-instantaneous communication a modern Internet user has come to expect, because of these
limitations many delays are created, which severely compromises the responsiveness of the app or
website.
An interesting solution, described in [19], involves traffic demultiplexing in the MAC layer.
Unlike the solutions previously described, it does not cause any significant drop in performance,
and the overhead is small. Using packet scheduling and MAC layer virtualization, it is possible to
mask the characteristics of the traffic, thus making side-channel attacks very difficult.
Another solution is using a covert channel to transmit data. In [20], the authors developed a
protocol that uses rate switching to hide data within an existing communication channel. How-
ever, this solution is dependant on the exploited system being non-deterministic or noisy "since
deterministic protocols are certifiably free of covert channels".
2.6 Analysis
Most publications about side-channel attacks do not consider the influence of network-level noise
on the accuracy of the classification algorithm. Instead, they test the actions - which can be
accessing a website or using a program - on a vacuum of sorts, in which it is assumed that no
other traffic beside the one that is the object of study is being generated, though some studies
do consider the possibility of noise coming from concurrent applications or programs running
simultaneously, like for example [3]. Analyzing the effect different traffic volumes and types of
network-level noise have on the classification is something that has not been studied in depth yet.
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The analysis of the differences between static and dynamic websites as far as the accuracy of
traffic classification goes is another under-explored theme. Detection accuracy may be linked to
how many dynamic, or interactive elements websites have. These elements can include videos,
banners with live information and advertising. There is no clear data indicating that one type of
website is easier to detect that the other, or if a classification algorithm can differentiate between
an dynamic or a static website.
After processing traffic captures, the normal procedure is to calculate a set of features to help
distinguish them. These features are used by the detection algorithm, which often makes use of
machine learning, to predict and classify new captures. This means that they are the basis for most,
if not all, side-channel attacks on 802.11. However, these features normally do not characterize a
traffic capture according to the shape of its traffic. The traffic can have unique traits that makes it
easier to be identified, as long as a feature which represents those characteristics is used.
These traffic shapes can be represented through graphs that plot the volume of data in bytes
transferred over time. Algorithms such as Dynamic Time Warping [21] could be applied so as to
determine mathematically how similar any pair of them are.
12 Literature Review
Chapter 3
Side-Channel Attack
The performing of a side-channel attack by an attacker requires preparation, including a theoretical
approach appropriate to the attack scenario. In this chapter, both aspects are studied.
3.1 Problem description
In this section the main problem, which this project aims to solve, will be explained.
3.1.1 Introduction
For the purpose of this dissertation we will assume the role of a potential attacker. In order to
understand both his objectives and his potential limitations, it is useful to describe the scenario in
which the attack would unfold.
Figure 3.1: Scenario of a potential attack
First and foremost, we have the victim. In this case, the victim could be any unsuspecting per-
son using their laptop to browse the Web, as long as it’s connected to a WiFi network. Nowadays
most of these networks offer WPA encryption, so we can assume that the traffic to and from the
device would be encrypted and theoretically indecipherable to others.
The attacker would be positioned within a few meters. Using his laptop, he would attempt
to capture the traffic flowing between the victim’s own laptop and the access point. To do so the
attacker does not need to be connected to the same network as the victim - in fact, he probably
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wouldn’t. So as to perform the captures the laptop’s wireless network adapter would have to be
configured in monitor mode, which in most models means that it can only monitor traffic, thus
disabling normal functioning and rendering the attacker unable to do some internet browsing of
his own. This limitation can be circumvented if the laptop has more than one WiFi interface - one
could be set to capture traffic, while the other is reserved for other activities.
This attack could be performed without alerting the victim, who would have no way to real-
ize that it’s underway. In fact, the attacker assumes a primarily passive role. No direct privacy
breaches are attempted, such as gaining access to the victim’s device or decrypting the traffic.
3.1.2 Attack model
After having captured some traffic, the attacker would then try to extract information from it. For
the sake of this project, we assume that they would seek to identify which website the victim had
connected to. All the data would be encrypted, so the attacker would have to find a way to perform
website identification without decrypting anything. As we have seen before, this would be a type
of side-channel attack.
It is possible to process the data contained in the capture files so as to obtain "features", which
could be used to identify the websites. In order to do that the attacker would need to have a
database of features for the websites he wishes to be able to detect, which represents a limitation. If
the victim accesses a website for which the attacker didn’t previously account for, the identification
would either be impossible or result in a false positive.
3.1.3 Influence of network-level noise
The scenario described thus far represents a quasi-perfect situation, in which there are no external
factors conditioning the effectiveness of the attack. It assumes that the victim would access a
single website, without any other activity being performed in parallel. This does not represent an
entirely realistic scenario, as more often that not when someone is browsing the internet there is
some other program transferring data. For instance, music streaming services and torrenting can
be running in the background. Even if the victim isn’t running any application that generates this
kind of traffic there are still some types of network traffic that normally occur like DHCP, which
is related to the management and attribution of IP addresses, interfaces and other network-related
configurations, or ARQ, a protocol that handles errors in data transmission. We can classify this
type of data transfer as network-level noise.
Network-level noise represents a setback for the attacker. All communications are wrapped
under 802.11 encryption protocols, which means that website detection could be hampered or
indeed nullified if the noise is sufficiently disruptive. Therefore, it is important for a potential
attacker to take these factors into account, and make sure their detection method is as effective as
possible even when faced with situations in which there is substantial noise. For that purpose, the
attacker must extend the database to include features of captures with multiple combinations of
websites and network-level noise.
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3.2 Solution
A possible solution to the problem presented in the previous section will now be explained. This
section focuses on the theoretical elements of the solution, while the details of the implementation
are presented in the next chapter.
Figure 3.2 shows the steps the attacker takes in order to successfully perform a side-channel
attack.
Figure 3.2: Flow of an attack, from the preparation to the execution
3.2.1 Website selection
As it was said in the previous section, the attacker can only detect the websites whose features are
stored in their database. This means that an important first step is to decide on a list of websites,
based on the objectives of the attack.
For the purpose of this dissertation, several websites where considered. Initially the focus was
on social media websites such as Facebook or Twitter, as they are some of the most widely used.
However, the look and content of these websites is often determined by the personal preferences
and the activity of the user, meaning that a meaningful dataset would be harder to obtain. The
experimental setup, which is explained in the next chapter, captures website information in their
default status, thus bypassing the influence of user’s customization. Capturing website data on
social media websites would require the automated capture system to perform a login every time,
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hence requiring a number of "test accounts". Setting them up would not be very practical, so in
the end it was decided that other websites would be used.
Among the alternatives considered, news websites seemed like the best candidates. They are
fairly popular, making them a viable target for an attack. Furthermore, their content is generally
not dependent on whether the user is logged in or not.
The decision on which websites to use was based on a few factors. First of all, there was the
objective of guaranteeing a certain diversity between them, both in terms of content and design.
There was also the preference for websites supporting HTTPS, so as to allow the traffic captures to
be integrated in another project which involves TLS-based fingerprinting. Finally, their popularity
was also taken into consideration, as a potential attack would have a greater chance of success
with a more widely known website.
In the end, five websites were chosen:
• Wall Street Journal (wsj.com)
• New York Times (nytimes.com)
• Bloomberg (bloomberg.com)
• The Guardian (theguardian.com)
• Financial Times (ft.com)
After further consideration, a decision to include five more websites was made. The reasoning
is that though the previously chosen websites were indeed diverse among themselves, they were
all dynamic in the sense that their content could vary greatly between captures. For instance, the
advertisement panels change frequently, as well as the front page by consequence of the different
news being highlighted. Banners with live updates are also variable according to the time the
website is accessed.
The addition of mostly static websites to the final list of websites for testing would help to
address the issues raised in the previous paragraphs, as well as verify the level of their influence
on the detection algorithm. Thus it was decided that five new websites would be added. They
were chosen among the University of Porto’s Faculties’, with all of them belonging to the Sigarra
"family". These websites are:
• Faculty of Science (sigarra.up.pt/fcup)
• Faculty of Engineering (sigarra.up.pt/feup)
• Faculty of Law (sigarra.up.pt/fdup)
• Faculty of Arts (sigarra.up.pt/flup)
• Faculty of Medicine (sigarra.up.pt/fmup)
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The final list includes ten websites, of which half can be classified as static and the other half
as dynamic. This characterization is not completely accurate in the sense that all websites include
both static and dynamic elements. However, there is a clear difference in the two groups.
Figure 3.3: Screenshot of bloomberg.com
Figure 3.4: Screenshot of sigarra.up.pt/feup
Take the website bloomberg.com for example. As we can see on figure 3.3, there are some
elements that can be considered dynamic. There is a video playing on the lower left-hand corner, a
banner with graphs showing the evolution of stocks, and an advertisement on the right-hand side.
And though it cannot be seen on the screenshot, some of the images on the background of the
news’ titles are animated.
On the other hand, a more static website such as FEUP’s, which can be seen on figure 3.4, does
not have any of these elements. The banners are static, and there are no animated advertisements
or videos playing. Therefore, it was decided that the manner in which these differences may result
in different detection accuracy rates would be studied.
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3.2.2 Features
Having selected the websites, the next step is finding the best way to characterize them. The
method to do so involves the calculation of features, which are derived from the processing of
traffic capture logs.
3.2.2.1 Raw data
The traffic capture logs contain information regarding to each packet, such as the MAC address of
both the origin and the destination, the timestamp and the size in bytes. Some of these features can
be seen in 3.5, which is a screenshot of a part of a traffic log visualized on the Wireshark software.
For instance, from left to right one can see the frame number, the relative timestamp, the source
and the destination. Other information that is not relevant is also present, though it can be filtered
on the data processing phase. That is explained on the next chapter.
Figure 3.5: Excerpt of a traffic capture log
Each packet also includes a set of flags. From those flags it is possible to infer whether a packet
is a Retry or not. A Retry packet is a copy of another packet that did not reach its destination. The
802.11 protocol supports the Retry feature in order to ensure that all packets are properly sent and
received.
These packets are not relevant to the attacker, since they are generated as a result of circum-
stances outside of the victim’s direct actions. For instance, the greater the distance of the victim’s
laptop to the access points the more of these packets will be present, due to the poorer connection.
Since Retry frames are easily identifiable through a flag, the attacker can filter them and therefore
not consider them when processing the captures.
All packets are encrypted by the WPA protocol, present in most WiFi networks. Therefore, the
amount of relevant information one can extract from each individual packet is low. However, it is
possible to analyze the entire log and extract features which might make distinguishing the web-
sites possible. A total of seven features were chosen, based on calculations with the information
that can be extracted from an encrypted capture.
3.2.2.2 Byte, packet and bitrate-based features
The five features presented in this section are based on the number of packets sent, as well as their
size in bytes. These are features are:
3.2 Solution 19
• Byte count: The accumulated size of the packets, in bytes.
• Packet count: The total number of packets.
• Average packet size: The average size of a packet, in bytes.
• Average Mbytes/s: The average speed of data transfer.
• Average Packets/s: Average number of packets sent each second.
3.2.2.3 Burst rate
The features presented on the previous section do not take into account variations in the bitrate and
packet per second rate. These can be important in defining a website, since each one generates a
different traffic pattern. For example, in 3.6 one can see an excerpt of a traffic capture, represented
through the packets sent every ten milliseconds. The shape of the pattern is not reflected in any
way in any of the previous features, since they just use the total values for the calculations.
Figure 3.6: Portion of a traffic capture graph
On that same figure one can also see that the traffic has periods in which it peaks, forming
a peak or a burst. These bursts can also be a way of characterizing a website, and so it became
relevant to design features that would take the burstiness of the capture into consideration.
These new features are:
• Burst rate: Corresponds to the percentage of the capture that is considered part of a burst.
• Average of the top 3 packets sent per window: The average of the three highest number of
packets sent on a 10 millisecond window.
In order to calculate the burst rate, the capture is first divided into intervals of ten milliseconds.
The value of ten milliseconds for the window provides sufficient resolution while not being too
taxing on the processor. On figure 3.6 one can visualize that this window is enough to see bursts.
For each interval, the number of non-retry packets are counted and then stored onto an array. The
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next step is to calculate the average of the three highest values. This average is one of the features,
and it permits the distinction between websites when the average "height" of their three tallest
bursts is different. It assumes that the same website will, for the most part, generate bursts of
similar height across captures.
A threshold is defined - in this case 40% of the aforementioned average - and when one of the
intervals has a value that exceeds it then it can be considered as being part of a burst. On figure
3.6, all intervals in which the line is above the red threshold are bursts.
The burst rate, which is the final feature, represents the level of burstiness of a capture. It can
be calculated as the percentage of intervals present in the capture that can be considered bursts,
as defined in the previous paragraph. In the case of two websites with a similar byte and packet
count, this feature can distinguish them, because the traffic shape can potentially be very different.
3.2.3 Dataset structure
The database is an important element in the structure of the attack. It is there that all the relevant
information regarding each captures is stored, to be later used as tool for identification. Therefore,
it is important that the database is structured in a functional way. For this proposed solution, the
database would be divided in three different tables: one for the raw, relevant information for each
packet of each capture; one for the features of each capture; finally, one for statistics regarding
each website.
The statistics would not be used for the attack. Instead, they would provide a visualization of
the average value of each feature, as well as its standard deviation, divided by website. Ideally, the
average values would be distinct for each one. A low deviation is also desirable, because the more
unpredictable a website it the more difficult it becomes to identify it.
3.2.4 Machine learning algorithm
Having a dataset is not enough to be able to identify websites. In fact, that detection would be
performed through a machine learning algorithm, which would be able to predict the identity of a
new capture based on the previously calculated features.
As a first step, an attacker would need to fill the database with information corresponding to the
websites that they would want to be able to identify. This includes, most importantly, the features
for each one. A high number of captures for every website would help ensure greater statistical
strength by representing possible variations within the same websites, making for a greater chance
of success when using the algorithm.
There are many kinds of ML algorithms, which means that finding out which of them work
best with the features available is important. For that purpose some testing is required, as accuracy
can vary greatly according to which algorithm is chosen.
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These are the algorithms and methods that were tested, using the sklearn Python package:
• Logistic Regression
• Linear Discriminant Analysis
• K-Neighbors Classifier
• Decision Tree Classifier
• Gaussian Naive Bayes
• Support Vector Machine
From these algorithms, two had a higher projected accuracy when compared to the others:
Decision Tree Classifier and Linear Discrimination Analysis. Tests show that the value of the
accuracy was above 60%, while other algorithms performed below 50%. . Further testing showed
that the Decision Tree Classifier yields slightly better accuracy, and was thus chosen for the next
phases of the testing.
Having completed the aforementioned preparations, the potential attacker might use the values
stored in the database to train the algorithm. When "fed" with the features of a new, unidentified
capture, the algorithm would perform a prediction.
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Chapter 4
Methodology and Approach
This chapter describes the process of taking the concepts and ideas described in the theoretical
solution and applying them into an experimental setup and procedure.
4.1 Experimental setup
Figure 4.1: Diagram of the various elements of the experimental setup
There are two main elements in the experimental setup: a laptop computer with a WiFi-capable
network card, and an access point connected to the internet. The connection between these two is
made through the WiFi network generated by the AP.
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The access point, which can be seen on the right-hand size of figure 4.1, is a router connected
to FEUP’s network which also provides access to the Internet. The reasoning behind the inclusion
of a personalized access point instead of using one of the existing ones is to ensure full control
of the network, therefore avoiding the interference of outside factors. The router can handle two
simultaneous connections coming form the same computer, as we will see further ahead. Addi-
tionally, outside connections coming from other computers are allowed, so as to permit the remote
operation of the laptop computer through an SSH connection. These connections are handled
through a cable connection, unlike the rest of the experiment.
The laptop possesses a network card, but for the purpose of the experiments an extra wireless-
capable network card is connected to the computer. The first card is used for connecting to the
Internet, while the second one is set to monitor mode, which allows it to simulate the perspective of
an attacker and obtain WPA-encrypted captures similar to what would be obtained in a real-world
setting. This way, the need for an extra computer to perform experiments is eliminated, as a single
laptop handles both the automated website access and the capture of its traffic.
The wlx interface that we can see on figure 4.1 handles the connection to the AP and, there-
fore, the Internet. The traffic generated by accessing the website flows through there. The wlp
interface, on the other hand, is set to monitor mode and doesn’t have an assigned IP address. The
aforementioned traffic is captured by this interface, using tcpdump, and saved onto a file.
However, there is a drawback to this setup, since the computer being connected to the Internet
via cable represents a problem. In normal conditions, applications and programs such as browsers
would, by default, use the cable connection instead of the wireless one, meaning that capturing
traffic becomes impossible. For the purpose of avoiding this situation, a solution was found:
creating a network namespace, inside which the browser and other programs related to traffic
capture would be launched. Executing these applications inside the namespace means that they are
"unaware" of all interfaces except the wireless one which they are supposed to use. This interface
connects to the Internet through the router, bypassing the cable connection and therefore allowing
the interface in monitor mode to capture the traffic needed for the experiments. In parallel, remote
control of the laptop is done through the cable connection, thus avoiding interference with the
experiments.
The experimental procedure, which works differently when noise is supported, will be de-
scribed in the next sections. The same hardware is always used - however, generating and ac-
counting for noise requires further software.
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4.2 Capturing traffic
Capturing traffic involves the use of several Python scripts, supported by the previously described
hardware as well as a number of programs and drivers.
4.2.1 Without network-level noise
Before performing a capture without noise, it is first necessary to ensure that all interfaces are
set correctly, as well as ensuring connectivity. After the initial check-up, the following sequence
ensues:
1. Using tcpdump, a program that allows capturing traffic, a new capture is initiated through
the interface that is set in monitor mode. This is necessarily the first step, so as to ensure
that everything is properly captured in the log file. The command used to start the capture
includes a filter that limits the packets it saves to the ones associated with the laptop’s MAC
address. This is followed by a one second interval, so as to allow the program to properly
start.
2. The wireless connection to the access point is reset, by means of two nmcli commands. The
reason behind this step is that in order to decrypt the capture file, thus removing the 802.11-
layer encryption, it is necessary to capture the 4-way handshake used by the WPA protocol
to negotiate a shared encryption key. If one has access to the network’s SSID and password,
it is possible to fully decrypt the capture file.
3. Since resetting the connection also deletes an important route for the namespace, without
which it cannot connect to the access point, a command is used to re-add this route.
4. Using Selenium, an instance of the Google Chrome browser is launched from within the
namespace, so as to force connection through wireless. The SSL key logfile is saved at this
point, so as to allow for decryption of the TLS layer if necessary. The browser accesses the
URL that was indicated, and waits for the page to be fully loaded. Afterwards it shuts itself
down, signaling the end of the capture.
5. The capture that was initiated in step one terminates itself, saving all the data gathered thus
far on a properly name files, allowing for quick identification of both the experiment and
website it belongs to and the number of the repetition. All other programs used for the
capture are also terminated.
4.2.2 With network-level noise
When simulating the existence of network-level noise it is necessary the emulate it by generating
traffic. In this case, UDP traffic with a constant bitrate was used.
UDP traffic was chosen over TCP as a way to generate noise because of its more suitable
characteristics. For instance, UDP is a connectionless protocol and therefore does not need or
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use acknowledgment packets, meaning that the packets being generated are sent regardless of any
network congestion measures usually implemented in TCP. This independece means that UDP is
more reliable in its behaviour, especially since there is no interest, in this case, in assuring that
every single packet reaches its destination.
The sequence of events for a capture with network-level noise is quite similar to the already
presented one, with the addition of two new steps, to be placed between steps 3 and 4 of the
previous list. These take advantage of the features of a program called iperf, which allows for the
generation of TCP or UDP traffic between two points. One of the two instances of iperf needs to
be set as server, while the other acts as client which creates and sends the packets to the former.
For the experiments,
The new steps are:
1. Create an instance of an iperf server on the laptop, which is listening for UDP traffic.
2. Create another instance of iperf, this time as a client. This instance must be placed "inside"
the namespace, so as to ensure the traffic flows through the same components as the rest of
the communications - namely that of the browser. The client starts sending UDP traffic at a
rate defined by the user, until it receives the shutdown signal after the capture ends.
Four levels of noise were considered: 10 KB/s, 50 KB/s, 100 KB/s and 200 KB/s. The values
were chosen so as to emulate both residual noise and traffic at the level that which accessing a
website generates, as well as values in between.
The aforementioned bitrates are far from the saturation point of the wireless interface that was
used for the experiment, which has a value of 6,75 MB/s. However, traffic generated at values
close to that would "drown out" the website access, since the values that were measured show that
a capture with no noise has a rate of around 200 KB/s in average. Therefore, the values that were
chose allow for a better characterization of the influence of network-level noise on the accuracy of
the classification algorithm.
4.3 Data processing
An important factor of the experiment is the processing done on captures after they are saved.
Python scripts handle this job. When given a folder containing WPA-encrypted capture files, they
extract the relevant information and save it onto a database.
For each file, the procedure is the following:
1. The connection with the database is established. If there is no database yet, it is created.
2. Using Wireshark, the network packet dissection of the capture is saved in a PDML (Packet
Description Markup Language) file. This a file type that supports XML standards, and
provides for a convenient way to access and process the raw data of each capture, divided
by packet.
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3. For each packet in the PDML file, the relevant information is extracted and saved onto a
database file. This includes:
(a) The frame number, which represents the order in which the packet was captured;
(b) The relative timestamp, which represents the time passed in seconds since the beggin-
ing of the capture;
(c) The size of the frame in bytes;
(d) The sequence number, which is a count of the frames performed by the 802.11 proto-
col;
(e) The MAC address of the source;
(f) The MAC address of the destination;
(g) The flag signaling whether the packet is a retry or not.
4. Optionally, a graph of the number of bytes transferred along the total time interval can be
generated.
5. The features for the whole capture are calculated, while ignoring the packets flagged as
retries. The ratio of retry packets is calculated, though it is not used as feature. The final
values are stored on the database.
6. After calculating and storing the features for all the captures, statistics are calculated for
each website and stored in the database as well.
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Chapter 5
Results
The first step before obtaining results is filling the database with captures and calculating their
features. Afterwards, Python scripts are used to perform testing on the classification algorithm,
as well as generate graphs, matrices and tables to help visualize the results. The tests are mainly
focused on measuring the accuracy of the machine learning prediction.
5.1 Dataset preparation
For each of the ten websites and for each of the five levels of noise (including the case in which
there is no noise), 25 captures were made, so as to confer statistical significance to the results. Fol-
lowing the procedures described on the previous chapter, captures were performed in automated
fashion over the course of a few hours.
There were a few captures that were not successful, due to crashes in the selenium drivers.
These captures were filtered out so as to avoid confusion on the detection process, because the
features calculated for these captures would be skewed when compared to the average of the
successful captures.
Following this, the captures were processed and its features were calculated and stored in the
database.
5.2 Preliminary analysis
5.2.1 Plots and graphs
Before testing the prediction algorithm it is possible to investigate the differences in the websites
by plotting the graphs corresponding to their captures and analyzing them. The most obvious way
of doing that is through empirical observation of the graphs, since the patterns generated by each
website have noticeable differences. The graphs generated for initial analysis are an accumulated
time series of the bytecount transmitted throughout the capture.
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Figure 5.1: Accumulated time series of a
ft.com capture
Figure 5.2: Accumulated time series of a
theguardian.com capture
Figure 5.3: Accumulated time series of two wsj.com captures
Figure 5.4: Accumulated time series of two bloomberg.com captures. The left one has no network-
level noise, while the one on the right has a noise level of 200KB/s
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the accumulate time series for two websites: Financial Times and
The Guardian. The total number of bytes transmitted are displayed on the vertical axis, while
the seconds passed are represented the horizontal axis. By observing the two graphs, one can see
that the shape of the traffic is noticeably different between the two websites. While accessing
ft.com results in the bulk of the data being transmitted within a smaller time frame, accessing
theguardian.com results on a more prolonged and irregular loading of the data. On the latter
we can see that there are gaps of around two seconds in which no data is loaded, resulting on a
step-like traffic shape.
On figure 5.4, one can verify that the presence of constant network-level noise influences the
shape of the traffic pattern. The variations in the byte count become more diluted because of the
noise, which in a way smooths the graph. If the noise was great enough in volume, the graphs of
all websites would be come all but impossible to distinguish visually.
Besides this empirical analysis, one can use Dynamic Time Warp to mathematically compute
a value representing the similarity between the shapes of two graphs. A Python library called
fastdtw, which is based on [21], was used to perform tests. Applying DTW to two time series
yields a distance. There are many types of formulas that can calculate that distance. The one used
for the tests in this chapter is the Bray-Curtis dissimilarity, given by
∑ |ui− vi|
∑ |ui + vi| (5.1)
where u and v are two-dimensional arrays.
For example, the distance between the two captures displayed in figures 5.2 and 5.1 is 1160
(rounded to the units). But if we take two captures of the same website, like the ones in 5.3, the
distance is only 3.
If we apply DTW to the two time series of figure 5.4, which belong to the same website with
different noise levels, the result is a distance of 2221. This value is higher than the one described
in the previous paragraph for two different websites, which might seem unexpected. It seems to
indicate that noise has a great impact on the detection of a website. However, the features that are
used to classify a website can be independent from this fact.
5.2.2 Statistics of the features
The classification algorithm uses the features of every capture in order to perform a prediction.
However, the database also includes a "statistics" table, which contains both the average and the
standard deviation of the features for each site. Analyzing this information, which is on table
5.1 allows for a preliminary characterization of the websites, and therefore the identification of
differences between them.
32 Results
Table 5.1: Statistics of the features of the captures present in the dataset (without noise)
Website Parameter Byte Count Packet Count Packet Size Burst Rate Top 3 Values MB/s Packets/s
ft
average 1413307 2014 701 2.777 42.231 0.105 149.822
deviation 243826 349.491 14.491 0.575 3.928 0.017 25.260
wsj
average 6073482 8506 714 5.047 63.983 0.282 393.859
deviation 461261 734.317 26.532 2.003 13.164 0.065 90.733
feup
average 1428462 2545 560 4.820 57.946 0.134 239.382
deviation 124116 206.601 8.062 0.630 3.991 0.017 28.444
flup
average 3341890 5844 571 9.878 67.472 0.284 497.338
deviation 70831 117.179 9.486 0.886 4.929 0.023 38.864
theguardian
average 4540632 6427 706 4.174 54.533 0.187 264.547
deviation 203522 278.522 20.322 1.283 9.857 0.039 53.509
fmup
average 3041932 5271 576 9.006 65.848 0.260 451.633
deviation 159733 282.223 6 1.006 4.195 0.027 47.625
fcup
average 3022676 5338 565 9.975 68.069 0.286 505.577
deviation 172181 311.392 10.246 0.934 4.925 0.027 48.387
nytimes
average 4465572 6344 705 4.066 49.173 0.190 270.362
deviation 385836 694.356 23.366 0.874 7.811 0.023 33.870
bloomberg
average 5102296 7106 718 3.614 56.333 0.175 244.297
deviation 249274 468.265 24.637 0.931 8.830 0.031 41.686
fdup
average 3691846 6410 575 10.913 69.507 0.321 558.764
deviation 99798 131.711 7.681 0.920 5.736 0.025 39.147
Table 5.2: Statistics of the features of the captures for sigarra.up.pt/fmup present in the dataset,
with all noise levels considered
Noise Level Parameter Byte Count Packet Count Packet Size Burst Rate Top 3 Values MB/s Packets/s
No Noise
average 3041932 5271 576 9.006 65.848 0.260 451.633
deviation 159733 282.223 6.00 1.006 4.195 0.027 47.625
10 KB/s
average 3157842 5400 584 8.193 65.869 0.241 413.823
deviation 148845 271 6.855 0.782 6.391 0.020 36.965
50 KB/s
average 3536767 5708 619 7.780 65.319 0.249 403.505
deviation 105844 145 12.767 1.150 4.233 0.034 57.484
100 KB/s
average 3923669 5920 662 8.120 65.287 0.285 431.654
deviation 92466 80 11.618 0.770 4.355 0.023 36.348
200KB/s
average 4530853 6235 725 8.625 61.746 0.341 470.327
deviation 263824 246 17.435 0.838 4.939 0.021 31.434
The values on table 5.1 show that some differences are apparent. For instance, the byte count
of the dynamic websites is, generally speaking, noticeably higher than that of static websites. The
average packet size is also higher in dynamic websites, which means than even on this preliminary
analysis one can distinguish between the two categories of websites.
By doing a website-by-website comparison one can also identify case in which there is a group
with very similar features. That is the case with flup (sigarra.up.pt/flup), fmup (sigarra.up.pt/fmup)
and fcup (sigarra.up.pt/fcup), whose features are, as far as average values go, close to each other.
Therefore it is predictable that the classification algorithm will have some difficulties in distin-
guishing the two websites.
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The presence of network-level noise on the captures influences the features of the websites.
The case for FMUP’s website is presented on table 5.2. Analysis of the table shows that, in general,
most features increase in value when the volume of noise is higher. This is especially noticeable
in the "Byte Count" and "Packet Count" features - which makes sense since the noise introduces
more packets, each adding more bytes to the capture. On the other hand there are features, like
"Burst Rate" and "Top 3 Values", that seem to be mostly independent from the noise rate. These
results are promising, since the fact that some features remain relatively stable even when the noise
increases means that detection is still possible with this feature set.
5.2.3 Machine learning algorithms
As mentioned on the previous chapter, after filling the database with the processed captures and
their features a choice of which machine learning algorithm to use was made. The sklearn Python
library has a feature that can estimate the accuracy (ranging from 0 to 1) of an algorithm for a
given dataset. Six algorithms were chosen for the preliminary accuracy-prediction tests, with the
objective of choosing a single one for the further tests. The results of the preliminary tests are
being presented on table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Predicted accuracy scores for the machine learning algorithms
Algorithm Accuracy Margin of Error
Logistic Regression 0,189 0,034
Linear Discrimination Analysis 0,617 0,043
K-Neighbors Classifier 0,212 0,054
Decision Tree Classifier 0,605 0,046
Gaussian Naive Bayes 0,486 0,033
Support Vector Machine 0,007 0,008
Two algorithms show greater accuracy than the others: Decision Tree Classifier and Linear
Discrimination Analysis. The former was ultimately chosen because even though its projected
accuracy slightly lower than that of the former, further testing showed that it had more reliable
results. We can therefore conclude that the projected accuracy is meant to be used only as a
general indicator, and more testing is always required.
The remaining algorithms showed poor performance, especially in the case of Support Vector
Machine. These results show that it is very important to choose an algorithm that is appropriate to
the dataset.
34 Results
5.3 Website detection
After building the dataset, the next step is testing the accuracy of the machine learning algorithm.
Using a Python script aided by the sklearn package, a battery of 500 tests are performed. At this
point, the captures with network-level noise are not considered. Each of the tests includes the
following steps:
1. Retrieve the data with the features for each of the captures;
2. Split the data in two parts: Train and Validate. The former is used for training the algorithm,
while the latter is used to validate the predictions. 15% of the data is used to validate, and
the rest for training;
3. Feed the algorithm with the Train data;
4. Perform predictions with the Validate data, using a Decision Tree Classifier;
5. Calculate the confusion matrix and add it to the matrix with the total results.
The fact that this procedure is repeated 500 times confers the results significant statistical
meaning, since a large number of combinations of a 85/15 split of the data is tested. In the end,
the result is a confusion matrix containing the totals of the predictions for every test. That matrix
is represented on 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Confusion matrix resulting from the battery of tests
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Table 5.4: Recall, Precision and F1 scores for each website
Website Recall Precision F1
Bloomberg 0,75 0,83 0,79
FCUP 0,45 0,58 0,51
FDUP 0,96 0,91 0,93
FEUP 0,98 0,98 0,98
FLUP 0,88 0,88 0,88
FMUP 0,68 0,55 0,61
Financial Times 0,97 1,00 0,98
New York Times 0,67 0,60 0,63
The Guardian 0,47 0,53 0,50
Wall Street Journal 0,90 0,85 0,87
Analysis of the confusion matrix shows that some websites are have a nearly perfect detection
rate, while others are more easily confused. Websites like FEUP and Financial Times are correctly
predicted almost every time, passing the vast majority of the tests. On the other hand, websites
like The Guardian and FCUP yield low accuracy rates.
The confusion matrix also lets us see what websites are mixed with each other. For instance,
The Guardian and New York Times are frequently identified in an incorrect manner by the algo-
rithm. Another relevant observation is that if we consider the sites by whether they are dynamic or
static, we notice that the confusion mostly occurs within the same group, with very few exceptions.
A more precise numerical analysis can be performed by calculating the recall, precision and
F1 scores for each website. The recall is given by
Precisioni =
Con f usion_Matrixii
∑ j Con f usion_Matrix ji
(5.2)
while the recall can be calculated with:
Recalli =
Con f usion_Matrixii
∑ j Con f usion_Matrixi j
(5.3)
Finally, the F1 score can be obtained by:
F1i = 2× Precisioni×RecalliPrecisioni +Recalli (5.4)
Using these formulas, the scores for the websites were calculated. The results, which can
potentially range from 0 to 1, are shown on table 5.4, and they confirm the observations that were
previously made. We can also see that the F1 score for static and dynamic sites is nearly the same
in average, with a value of around 75% for the latter and 78% for the former. Another notable
result is that Financial Times sustains a 100% precision score over the 500 tests.
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5.4 Influence of network-level noise
So as to evaluate the influence of noise on the algorithm, new tests were performed, this time
taking into account the captures with noise. As was previously stated, the captures contemplated
five scenarios: No noise and noise levels of 10 KB/s, 50 KB/s, 100 KB/s and 200 KB/s. On all
confusion matrices from this point forward, these noise levels are represented in Kbits/s: 80 Kb/s,
400 Kb/s, 800 Kb/s and 1600 Kb/s.
The first tests are the same as in the previous chapter, with the difference that the algorithms is
trained with all captures, including those with noise. Likewise, all levels of noise for each website
are tested. The new confusion matrix, represented on figure 5.6, and the accuracy scores on table
5.5 show the overall results for every website, without distinguishing the levels of noise.
Figure 5.6: Confusion matrix resulting from the battery of tests with noise
A similar pattern to the one observed on figure 5.5 is formed. Once again, the websites that
a given website is confused with are, for the most part, of the same class (dynamic or static).
However, some sites seem to have lost some of the accuracy, as is the case with Bloomberg and
FLUP. In fact, this observation can be confirmed by table 5.5, where we can see that those are
the websites with the biggest drop in terms of F1 score, of around 30%. The other websites show
smaller, and mostly negative, variations. FCUP and FDUP seem to benefit from the situation,
since their F1 score increases, though not too much.
It’s worth saying that the number of predictions shown on the confusion matrix on figure 5.6
is larger than those on the matrix on figure 5.6 because the dataset is now five times larger, since
for each website captures for each of the four levels of noise are added.
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Table 5.5: Recall, Precision and F1 scores for each website (with noise)
Website Recall Precision F1 F1 ∆
Bloomberg 0,53 0,51 0,52 - 0,27
FCUP 0,60 0,61 0,60 + 0,09
FDUP 0,82 0,79 0,80 - 0,13
FEUP 0,95 0,95 0,95 - 0,03
FLUP 0,55 0,56 0,55 - 0,33
FMUP 0,62 0,69 0,65 + 0,04
Financial Times 0,96 0,96 0,96 - 0,02
New York Times 0,58 0,61 0,59 - 0,04
The Guardian 0,47 0,45 0,48 - 0,02
Wall Street Journal 0,81 0,85 0,80 - 0,07
In order to make a more in-depth analysis, we need to show how the algorithm reacts to the
websites when the network-level noise changes. To that end, individual matrices are generated for
each website. We can see two examples in figures 5.7 and 5.8, which correspond to FLUP and
Bloomberg respectively. Figure 5.9 contains the information for all the websites, and provides a
general view In fact, the individual matrices are only segments of this larger matrix, which is also
harder to interpret.
The detection rate of FLUP’s website seems to to decrease with the increase of the noise
level, with the sharpest drop happening at the 100 KB/s noise level. However, this trend does not
continue when the noise is at 200 KB/s, in which the detection rate increases again. The results
can be confirmed by observing table 5.6, where we can see that the F1 score steadily decreases as
the noise increases, with the exception of 200 KB/s. These results seem to indicate that noise has a
direct negative influence on detection, but the irregularity verified on this last case means making
such a conclusion is not possible.
On the other hand, Bloomberg’s results are more erratic. The F1 score is higher when the
noise is at 10 KB/s or 200 KB/s, when compared to no-noise case. However, the other noise rates
decrease the accuracy of the algorithm. Therefore we cannot make any meaningful conclusion
about the influence of noise in this case. That said, there is a similarity with FLUP: a noise rate
of 50 KB/s or 100 KB/s yields the worst results. This is also verified in the case of FEUP and
Finantial Times, but it doesn’t happen with enough regularity to consider it a trend or to extract
conclusions.
Table 5.6: F1 scores for each website and each level of noise
Noise Level Bloomberg FCUP FDUP FEUP FLUP FMUP Fin. Times NYT The Guardian WSJ
No Noise 0,60 0,64 0,80 0,95 0,86 0,75 0,96 0,42 0,53 0,67
10 KB/s 0,73 0,69 0,73 0,93 0,72 0,83 0,95 0,66 0,56 0,70
50 KB/s 0,42 0,67 0,77 0,92 0,63 0,88 0,87 0,90 0,73 0,95
100 KB/s 0,39 0,91 0,79 0,86 0,54 0,65 0,94 0,54 0,48 0,75
200 KB/s 0,70 0,47 0,86 0,96 0,64 0,84 0,97 0,77 0,58 0,83
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Figure 5.7: Confusion matrix regarding FLUP, with five levels of noise
Figure 5.8: Confusion matrix regarding Bloomberg, with five levels of noise
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Figure 5.9: Confusion matrix for all websites, with five levels of noise
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The results obtained for this thesis allow for the drawing of some conclusions, which are described
in this chapter. A reflection about the results, and how they compare to the expected results, is also
included in this chapter, as well as suggestions for future work.
6.1 Analysis of the results
The main objective of this thesis was to devise a model for an attack capable of, based on previ-
ously captured data, identify a website. In the case in which no noise is considered, we can say
that that objective has been achieved, since all websites had an F1 score of at least 50%, with the
overall average being at 76,8%. Two websites, FEUP and Financial Times, came close to a perfect
score with 98%. These results are aligned with the expectations, and can be considered positive
as they prove an attacker would be able to successfully identify the websites studies in this thesis
with a fairly decent success rate.
Conclusions can be made about the importance of how static a website is on the accuracy of
the detection process. The average F1 score for both groups - dynamic and static - is very similar,
no matter if noise is considered, to the extent that one can affirm that, in the case of the websites
tested in this dissertation, this is not an important factor by itself. However, the confusion matrices
show that websites tend to be mostly confused with other websites of a similar static level.
The results of the testing with network-level noise yielded mixed results. The expectations
were that the application of a constant bitrate UDP traffic during the captures would result in them
being more difficult detect with the machine learning algorithm. However, the analysis of tables
5.5 and 5.6 shows that while the F1 score of most sites remains similar (within a difference of 0,1)
to the rates when there is no noise, the overall F1 score drops by 0,08 , from 0,77 to 0,69, or 69%.
Furthermore, the original expectations were that for each website, the F1 score would drop as
the noise rate increased. That was not observed on the experimental results, and instead the F1
score appeared to vary in an erratic way. In fact, in the case of some websites a certain noise rate
had the effect of increasing the F1 score. Therefore, no definite conclusions could be drawn in
terms of the influence of network-level noise.
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6.2 Future work
There are some improvements that could be made to both the methodology and the solution, since
the results show that some questions remains unanswered. Those improvements could be:
• Increase the number of websites included in the testing. This could help determine how
the number of websites on the database affects confusion and F1 scores. Within the same
website pool, different combinations could be tested.
• Correct the issues with the capture process, especially the selenium crashes that compromise
some of the captures. They also introduce some delays in the automated capture process,
which means that eliminating them would allow for more captures to be done in less time.
• Optimize the processing of the captures. Extracting the data from the captures can be made
to be faster, thus reducing significantly the processing time, which can take a lot of time in
the current version.
• Devise more features to characterize the captures. In theory, if more features are added and
they show variability between websites it is expected that the overall F1 score will improve.
• Test more levels of network-level noise, with an increased bitrate compared to the ones
tested in this thesis, so as to be closer to saturating the WiFi interface and affect website
detection further. The results obtained with the currently considered noise levels were in-
conclusive, which can be due to the fact that they are still not high enough to significantly
decrease the F1 scores.
• The noise that was generated in the experiments was UDP with a constant bitrate. Other
kinds of noise could be tested, such as TCP or SCTP. The traffic can also be sent in a more
irregular manner, instead of the current manner in which uniformly sized packets are sent at
a nearly constant rate. Sudden bursts of noise traffic can confuse features reliant on traffic
shape, as with case of the burst rate.
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